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Abstract
Over the last 20 years the theoretical concept of the commons has come to be used not only in the field of natural resources
management, but also as a key notion in domains as diverse as the digital economy and alternative politics. The wide use of the
term has, however, led to a loss of specificity in the way it is used. Across several disciplines the commons is often used almost
interchangeably with terms such as open access, common property, public domain, public goods, or common pool resources. We
examine the reasons for the increasing conflation of these concepts over time. The field emerged as the result of the collaboration
of two types of theoretical work: a) the study of common pool resources which focused on the characteristics of the resources in
order to predict social behaviour, and b) research on the analysis of common property regimes that focused on the structural
characteristics of the institutions devised to manage those resources. This difference in emphasis resulted in the development of
two sets of concepts to refer to the same processes but from slightly different perspectives. With increasing interest in research
focussed on the commons, these concepts are often used uncritically and their original designations are conflated across a suite of
categories.
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Introduction
We present here a critical review of the literature on the
commons, a field of research that emerged at the intersection
of property theory and collective action theory (Crawford and
Ostrom 1995) that has expanded exponentially from its initial
focus on natural resources management to domains as diverse
as the digital and the political commons. The goal was always
to study the ensemble of norms and rules used by a social
group to distribute the benefits of a good or service as well
as the costs derived from their implementation (Ostrom 1995).
The literature involved is vast and we do not attempt to
summarize the last 50 years of commons theory, but rather
focus on the conflation of designations ascribed to concepts
that are now used across diverse research fields.
The expansion of commons theory into non-traditional
areas of research suggests the need for a critical revision of
some of its foundational concepts and traditions as this theo-
retical diversification has resulted in a relative conceptual
blurriness: some key concepts, in different domains, are used
in clearly different and often oppositional ways. Attempts to
refine the use of commons’ concepts outside its limited orig-
inal context expose some weaknesses and contradictions.
The study of the commons has for a long time been bifur-
cated into two research strands: one that focused on studying
the characteristics of common pool resources themselves, and
one focussed on the structural characteristics of the institutions
devised to manage the resources, referred to as common prop-
erty regimes. This theoretical richness is also at the source of
the conceptual confusion, since most cases under study in the
field require a hybrid approach that deals with both resources
and institutions.
First, it is important to scrutinize the concept common pool
resources (CPRs) as a key notion to the entire field of the
commons. It was developed by researchers interested in the
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REVISED PROOFbehaviour (collective action theory). The use of the term com-mon property resourcewithout clear differentiation from com-
mon pool resource generated important problems in how the
commons are discussed and described. There is no such a
thing as a common property resource. Resources, however
defined, can be managed in completely different ways in dif-
ferent times and places depending on technologies available
or dominant political structures. Even more confounding,
these two expressions and a third one, common property
regime, all of them important to the field, generate the same
acronym (CPR). Second, we identify the tendency in the po-
litical and digital commons literature to use the concept
commons as a synonym of open access. This usage of these
two categories is worrisome and nullifies decades of theoret-
ical debate and discussion to disentangle them. That some
disciplines use the term open access to describe resources that
are not regulated and are accessible to anyone while others
favour the use of the term public domain for the same purpose,
also generates potential confusion. This confusion is further
compounded since those that use the expression open access
regularly use the term public property to identify resources
managed by the State. Finally, in the political domain, often
in the form of NGOs or cooperatives, new communal spaces
are regularly being created. Many of the fields of action of
these actors, however, require an intricate relationship with
public administration, including, for example, issues related
to funding, permits, and management. This is not to say new
commons will not emerge from these activities, but that each
case must be analysed in its own context. One possibility, for
example, is the emergence of hybrid spaces where the com-
munal and the public (in the sense of State jurisdiction) might
be in close interaction.
This critical review of our field does not intend to negate
that property theory and the commons are useful analytical
tools, on the contrary. There is, however, a generalized sense
that a lack of rigorous specificity in the use of terms and
concepts, without critical revision, will limit our ability to
develop a fully integrated and consistent theoretical corpus.
The Commons, Collective Action,
and the Definition of Common Pool
Resources: Resources Versus Ownership
The anthropology of property, the study of ownership as a
social relation, a legal framework, or a complex set of rights
and obligations, has a long history (Turner 2017). In 2018 we
celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of Hardin’s seminal paper,
“The Tragedy of the Commons,” connecting ecology, eco-
nomics, and politics through the analysis of natural resource
management systems. Hardin attributed the characteristics of
open access resources to the commons. His approach to com-
mon property emphasized its inefficiencies, and ultimately
predicted its inevitable demise as a result of the contradictory
pressures that unregulated users put on its resources.
According to Hardin, only individual private property (or
State management) could curb this “innate” tendency towards
overuse and collapse of valuable resources.
It took 30 years of research from several disciplines, cul-
minating in the foundation of the International Association for
the Study of Commons Property (IASCP) in 1989, the publi-
cation of Governing the Commons by Elinor Ostrom in 1990,
Making the CommonsWork edited byDaniel Bromley in 1992
(offshoot of a 1985 NAS panel), and the National Science
Foundation collective piece The Drama of the Commons
(2002), to institute an alternative explanation of common
property as a form of regulated collective private property.
Hardin accepted this fact in 1994 by rewriting his piece as
“The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons,” and in 2009
Elinor Ostrom was awarded the Nobel Prize for Economics
for her work on collective action. In the process of sorting out
the fundamental concepts of this rising new field, a solid the-
oretical corpus emerged (Feeny et al. 1990).
Common property is not based on the absence of exclu-
sionary regulations and use protocols. On the contrary, tradi-
tional common property was, in essence, private group prop-
erty, places and resources regulated by exclusionary and in-
clusionary criteria (Bromley 1989, 1991). Moreover, it was
understood that ownership could not be studied as a static
institution, but as a social process, context and time dependent
(Galaty 2016; Hall et al. 2011; Hann 2003; Strang and Busse
2011), that identifies rights of ownership and access (Ribot
and Peluso 2003), that can define a community itself
(Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Li 1996; Verdery 2018), and that
is comprised of a complex bundle of rights in terms of attri-
butes and resource use (Commons 1893; Schlager and Ostrom
1992). At the same time, it was recognized that sustainable
management was also context dependent and not ensured by
any managerial regime (Bauer 2006; Ensminger 1996; Peters
1994). In the context of concepts of common property, insti-
tutions cannot be studied as fixed entities, but rather as part of
a complex and evolving discursive reality in which, as the
proponents of discursive institutionalism emphasize, commu-
nication and inter-subjective appropriation matter (Schmidt
2008, 2011).
In contemporary research, concepts associated with ‘the
commons’ are now used not only in natural resources man-
agement, but also as a key to describing the drivers of the
digital economy and alternative politics. The widening accep-
tance of the concept has exacerbated the loss of specificity in
the way it is used, so that terms such as ‘commons,’ ‘open
access,’ ‘common property,’ ‘public domain,’ ‘public goods,’
or ‘common pool resources’ are often used almost
interchangeably.
Property theory (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop 1975;
Demsetz 1974; Hallowell 1943; Netting 1982) and collective
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been applied mostly to socio-ecological systems has worked
well (Berkes and Folke 1998).
Post-Hardin property theory situates all forms of property
in four ideal and internally diverse groups: open-access (a
free-for-all absence of ownership and use regulations), com-
mon property (collective private property), individual private
property, and public property (owned by abstract, formal in-
stitutions such as the State). The emphasis of the analysis is on
the certainty provided by the legal and institutional arrange-
ments over the future control of the resource (Merrill and
Smith 2001). This focus resulted in the development of the
conception of property as a bundle of rights (Coase 1960;
Commons 1893). All ownership relations could be subdivided
into at least three levels: formal ownership (title), managerial
rights (the right to decide what to do with the resources), and
usufruct (the actual use of the resources) or in Schlager and
Ostrom’s (1992) formulation: access, withdrawal, manage-
ment, exclusion, and alienation (1992). These levels and attri-
butes might reside in the same individual, group of individ-
uals, or institution(−s), or be unevenly distributed across dif-
ferent stakeholders. In addition, the resource might be
assessed in terms of its characteristics: excludable (some users
are able to exclude others) versus non-excludable, and ex-
haustible versus non-exhaustible (rivalrous versus non-rival-
rous1) (Heller 2010). This classificatory scheme defines a very
specific typology of goods: private goods (excludable and
rivalrous), club goods (excludable and non-rivalrous), com-
mon pool resources (non-excludable and rivalrous), and pub-
lic goods (non-rivalrous and non-excludable) (Ostrom 2005)
(Fig. 1).
Ostrom and other scholars identified with what is termed
New Institutionalism (Mulé 1999; Nee 1998) identified
criteria by which collective action (the practice of functional
collective management) was optimally to emerge and success-
fully manage a resource, facilitating the emergence and imple-
mentation of excludability clauses (Ostrom 1990, 2005).
These criteria could include (but not be limited to): an easily
identifiable group of people with rights to the resource and a
clearly defined and delimited resource (inclusion versus ex-
clusion); whether managerial rules have been locally de-
signed; the larger the user group, the harder it will be for
collective action to consolidate (Chamberlin 1974); existence
of legitimate mechanisms of control and conflict resolution
(Agrawal 2001; Edney and Bell 1983). This focus on the
capacity to exclude, implicitly, draws our attention to the idea
of boundaries (Fennell 2011; Merrill 1998). Successful collec-
tive action articulated through inclusion/exclusion criteria re-
sults in the consolidation of common property. This emphasis
on prediction however, required maintaining a conceptual du-
ality: any given system before collective action is implement-
ed is a common pool resource (CPR): “a [CPR is a] type of
good consisting of a natural or human-made resource system,
whose size or characteristics makes it costly, but not impossi-
ble, to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits
from its use” (Ostrom 1990: 30).
This definition assumes that there are unclaimed resources
over which social groups might succeed or fail to articulate
collective action. Collective action theory thus requires or as-
sumes a moment zero from which to start the analysis of the
development of collective agency. In that moment the re-
source is a common pool resource (CPR). There is not, of
course, a moment zero of a natural resource system, a moment
x in which a resource is common pool, and a moment x + 1 in
which that system has transmuted into either open access or
commons. If nobody is using it, and nobody is interested in
using it, it is not a resource. If the economic and cultural shift
has occurred and something has been redefined as a resource,
that implies that someone wants to use it, or is using it, it is
already being managed as open access, common property, or
in some other way. Thus, CPRs are an intellectual fiction. In
addition, what does “costly, but not impossible” mean in this
context? Commons as collective property rested on the prin-
ciple of effective excludability, while commons as a common
pool resource is based exactly on the opposite, the theoretical
openness of the resource. In other words, common pool re-
sources are systems where a type of resource prior to the
articulation of a potential collective action is, in effect, a
completely untapped system. Common pool resources can
become institutionalized commons (common property) if the
organization of collective action is successful, or might be
used as open access resources if the organizational effort fails.
Common pool resources is a concept that emerged from the
theoretical effort of debunking Hardin’s tragedy of the com-
mons but, paradoxically, suffers its same contradictions: it
conflates open access and common property. We argue that
the use of the common pool resource artifice is one of the
sources of the conceptual murkiness that is currently apparent
in commons research. This confusion, as Ostrom pointed out
(2000), is compounded by the fact that, in the literature, CPRs
sometimes refer to common pool resources and sometimes to
common property resources (Ashenafi and Leader-Williams
2005; Berkes 1989; Dasgupta 2005; Wade 1987).
Ostrom et al. (2002:14) point out “The importance of the
distinction between the characteristics of the resource (com-
mon pool resource) and the regime that manages the resource
(common property regime or some other kind of property
regime).” Research on the commons has tended to bifurcate
depending if the focus was on the resource itself or on its
1 The fact that my use of a resource affects the possibility of others using the
resource (rivalrous) does not ensure overuse or restraint, nor presence or ab-
sence of regulations (or even which type of regulation). Private goods, club
goods, common pool resources, and public goods’ categorization defines re-
sources and their physical characteristics, not regulations (which is what the
private, common, public property, and open resources categorization does).
Hum Ecol
REVISED PROOF
governance regime. From a resource management perspec-
tive, it is more important to understand the characteristics of
the resource: whether it is excludable or non-excludable, or
exhaustible or non-exhaustible.
Furthermore, the focus on the resource potentially splits the
system between stocks and flows (Gerber and Steppacher
2017; Hoffmann 2013). This focus on the distinction between
the patch of land and the crops that are harvested from it is
certainly important and allows for a refining of the analysis of
the bundle of rights, but still requires the incorporation of
institutional analysis and, consequently, of the battery of con-
cepts needed for its accurate implementation (Hartley 2018).
Although from an institutional perspective, the focus is on
the ownership regime, the use of the CPR notion presumes the
existence and even perhaps the prevalence of the resource
over the ownership regime (Gardner et al. 1990). The re-
sources classification system is not problematic from the per-
spective of exhaustibility: either consumption reduces the
amount available for further consumption, or it does not. It
is a simple binary approach. Excludability, however, as a char-
acteristic of a resource system is more complicated to grasp as,
despite also being presented as binary, it is in fact, a continu-
ous graded quality. At what point does a resource go from easy
to difficult to exclude? The same resource might be managed
in different ways, in different places by different people. The
potential for excludability is not fixed across time and locali-
ties. In other words, a resource might be costly to manage in
an exclusionary way, but technology, demographics, and pol-
itics, to name a few factors, change across time (Anderson and
Grewell 1999). The forests of New England, once a vast and
unreachable arboreal extension, a CPR, are now a mosaic of
property regimes, including a majority of individual and cor-
porate private property (Acheson 2000). Were those forests
CPRs if appropriating them was so simple that even the cost-
liest of property regimes – private property - can be imple-
mented over them? This argument can also be applied to, for
instance, important parts of the Eastern Africa savannas
(Bollig and Lesorogol 2016; Lesorogol 2008), or the
Midwest plains, whose excludability costs were changed for-
ever by the introduction of barbwire (Dolan 2014). In some
places, coastal and marine resources, often presented as quin-
tessential examples of natural goods that are extremely diffi-
cult to defend and subject to exclusionary measures have also
been managed using collective institutional arrangements
(Acheson 1988; Kurien 1991; McCay 1998). A resource, at
a particular moment in time, might not be managed via exclu-
sionary regulations, and 30 years later it might have become
private property. Was this resource, exactly the same piece of
land, forest, or river, a common pool or a private resource?
The actual biophysical characteristics of the resource have not
changed, but the technological capabilities or the socioeco-
nomic priorities of its users might. In other words, the charac-
teristics of the resource are not irrelevant, but they do not
irrevocably define the property regime that will be implement-
ed. Can a resource be understood detached from its time and,
consequently, from its ownership/managerial regime
(Bromley 1992a, b; McCay and Acheson 1987)? Common
property resources, as an essential immutable category, to go
back to an earlier point, do not exist.
Ostrom herself reflects on the fact that not distinguishing
between a resource system and property system is one of the
classic sources of confusion in property theory. In a later pub-
lication, despite her abovementioned definition of CPRs that
highlights their extremely high exclusion costs, she adds:
“Common pool resources may be owned by national, region-
al, or local governments; by communal groups; by private
individuals or corporations; or used as open access resources
by whomever can gain access. Each of the broad types of
property regimes has different sets of advantages and disad-
vantages” (2000: 338). In other words, the characteristics of
the resource do not help us to predict its patterns of use and
management, and might change across time. However, this in
itself is puzzling. The use of the term “resource” points at use
and management, otherwise we would be talking about natu-
ral features, landscape, or the environment. If we talk about
resources, we are talking about the use and management
(property regimes in all their complexity) of components of
the world. When we study the commons, even if we focus on
the characteristics of the resource, our ultimate goal has been
to understand how they have been used and appropriated: the
characteristics of their property regimes. This is not to say that
the characteristics of the resources do not matter, but that
exclusive focus on the physical characteristics of the resource
has tended to define a deterministic approach that has ob-
scured the fact that history and politics have as much of an
impact on the prevalent ownership structure as, for instance,
the seasonality or the size of the resource (Agrawal 2003).
This raises the question of whether CPR is a useful concept,
and whether it makes any difference if the starting point of a
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an actual commons, collective private property, if exclusion
and regulation are successfully enforced. We claim that CPRs
are not in fact needed and that collective action can be studied
in systems that we might define as open access or common
property depending on the regulations in place without losing
any analytical potential and without risking the possible con-
fusion of using the same term, “common,” for two different
things.
The use of the concept of CPRs does not contribute to the
understanding of the changes in the ways a system is man-
aged. On the contrary, as the term includes the word “com-
mon,” and common property is a potential outcome of collec-
tive action (the other being open access), the confusion easily
emerges and we encounter cases in which CPR and commons
are assumed as synonymous, and cases in which the terms
commons and open access are used interchangeably. Hardin
(1968) mixed the characteristics of open access and the com-
mons. This confusion was compounded by the fact that he
used the same term, the commons, to sometimes describe re-
sources and sometimes a managerial regime. In his later work
he referred to the unmanaged commons (1994). Nevertheless,
subsequent literature on the subject is still packed with exam-
ples that conflate open access and commons, and very often
this is because the differences between the commons as a
resource and the commons as a managerial scheme are also
overlooked.
The Expansion of the Concept
of the Commons
The proliferation of work on the commons in fields beyond
natural resource management forces us to rethink the concep-
tual limits of the framework built by the theory of the com-
mons (Hess 2008). For decades, most property theorists work-
ing with natural management of fish, timber, or grass, have felt
comfortable associating common pool resources to commons.
When the theory of the commons is used for research on
software, knowledge, streets, playgrounds, internet, libraries,
or social housing, however, it is clear that systems with very
different characteristics, in terms of excludability criteria, for
instance, are treated as equivalent and conceptual clarity is lost
in the process. In these fields the distinction between common
pool resources and public goods becomes harder to identify.
For example, Wikipedia is a quintessential public domain
resource, a public good in its phase of use or consumption (it
presents an open access approach to a non-rivalrous resource).
Wikipedia and a large part of open access software, however,
in their phase of production, are managed and worked by a
closed community with clear behavioural and excludability
rules. During its phase of production important examples of
digital commons are indeed a communal endeavour.
However, Wikipedia, in its phase of use, strictly speaking,
cannot qualify as a form of commons. It is, in a way, a stock
versus flow dilemma. Wikipedia’s definition of itself, howev-
er, merges production and distribution to be able to define
itself as commons:
“The digital commons are a form of commons involving
the distribution and communal ownership of informa-
tional resources and technology. Resources are typically
designed to be used by the community by which they
are created. Examples of the digital commons include
wikis, open-source software, and open-source licensing.
The distinction between digital commons and other dig-
ital resources is that the community of people building
them can intervene in the governing of their interaction
processes and of their shared resources.” (Wikipedia,
accessed on July 4th, 2017)
The commons as a concept is used in this digital context to
describe processes of cooperation and sharing that produces a
common field of action (Benkler 2006). We are moving from
the fixed social and juridical relationship described by territo-
rial property theory towards a concept that describes a frame-
work of social interaction amidst the information economy
(Hess and Ostrom 2007): a framework that allows relations
of production to occur outside the commodified sphere of a
capitalistic quid pro quo where cooperation and sharing gen-
erates free open access resources (software, journals, etc.).
The Internet becomes a putative symbol of the public domain,
the place where everything, by definition, is public, open ac-
cess (Bollier and Helfrich 2014; Boyle 2008). It is clear that in
these spaces the concepts of open access and common prop-
erty are often used interchangeably or indistinguishably.
In fact, in order to properly understand the digital com-
mons, they must be conceptualized as a two-step process:
the first level is production, and at that level regulated com-
munities, with rules of access and interaction – true institu-
tionalized commons - exist. At a second level, the use or
consumption of these digital commons, more often than not
we are talking about open access resources, as no excludabil-
ity clause exists. These are resources that differ from pastures
or fisheries because they are inexhaustible and the free rider
effect is negligible. The emphasis in the “commons” of the
“digital commons” ignores resource use and focuses on pro-
duction governance (Dulong de Rosnay and Le Crosnier
2012), identifying, de facto, two levels of analysis: the first
encompasses the producers of the resource (software, infor-
mation hubs, etc.) and their governance; the second focuses on
the resource itself, which is a non-rivalrous product that it is
used as public domain (a form of open access).
This line of reasoning will force an additional conceptual
revision. The community, as a concept, must be problematized
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act with a resource (those not excluded). Research must take
into consideration that the composition of the community
might be the same or different in each phase of the develop-
ment of any given resource (management, production, and
use). The community will remain a fundamental concept,
but will take shape differently for the environmental, digital,
and political commons, and across the different phases of the
resource system development (Fuster 2010; Jeffrey et al.
2012).
The fact that the products of the digital economy are
knowledge-based, based on the word, or more broadly, narra-
tives (textual, audible, and visual), emphasizes the importance
of free access. The free speech notion with the contribution of
the libertarian (not liberal) ideological approach conceptual-
ized those narratives as either commons or open access re-
sources (Coleman 2009). The process of digitalization of cul-
ture and community building has had consequences on how
resources thus generated are constructed: “The social practices
of free and open software raise the idea that forms of property
can be antithetical to the principles of free speech” (Coleman
2004: 508). This emphasis on the commons as freedom is
what connects the digital commons with the alternative polit-
ical commons (Broumas 2017a; Papadimitropoulos 2017).
The idea that the computer world has generated common pool
resources obscures two points: 1) the goods were generated by
closed or semi-closed communities capable of self-regulating
in a regime that could be understood as communal, but 2) that
the product is indeed used and shared through non-
exclusionary means effectively defines these goods in their
consumptive phase as public goods (a form of open access).
However, the digital economy is under a lot of exclusionary
pressure to privatize (enclose) in order to sell and, therefore,
generate benefit. Paradoxically, in this domain, open access is
achieved through privatization and regulation (Kelty 2008).
This is the role of the plethora of licensing strategies such as
the Creative Commons designed to moderate or control the im-
pact of privatization over knowledge circulation (Vercelli 2009).
Thus, paradoxically, the digital commons have been created on
the Internet to counteract privatization trends, trying to preserve
open access through licencing (Coriat 2015; Turner 2010).
The Budapest Manifesto provides a narrative and an intel-
lectual framework for this liberalization of knowledge (IUGG
GeoRisk 2002). The goal is to produce freely accessible
knowledge disseminated using the Internet. At least since its
publication in 2001, open access research has been a funda-
mental part of the academic political agenda. Nowadays all
researchers receiving public funding in the EU, the US, or
Canada, must publish their findings in open access journals.
This emphasis “on access to and preservation of scientific
information” is also apparent in the 2016 Mallorca
Declaration on Open Science. The European Commission,
in its Europe’s future: open innovation, open science, open
to the world, published by the Directorate of Research and
Innovation, states: “We propose policy measures to develop
openness as an inclusive tool: openness as “commons””
(2017: 16). It purposely and emphatically conflates openness
and commons. In this policy document, the commons official-
ly means open access. The fusion of the two concepts is alas
complete.
This conceptual blurriness can be identified in the works of
digital economy theorists as well as key figures of the alterna-
tive political left. A key thinker of the political commons
movement, Bollier, starts one of his key books: “[The author’s
interlocutor said:] ‘Oh, I get it! The commons are things that
no one owns and are shared by everyone.’ [and the author
said] Well put” (2014: 13). In an interview, a political com-
mons reference writer (Laval), using a language we have al-
ready encountered in some pieces devoted to the digital com-
mons, states: “To talk about the commons is to overcome the
logic of appropriation and property” (in Parés 2017: 99). In a
similar vein, the radical digital artist Cornelia Sollfrank, in a
presentation entitled, Art and Speculative Commons at the
Reseau Exagram, Concordia University, discussed “(…) what
artists can contribute to free culture and, eventually, the com-
mons” (2017 Common lab interview, 7′34″).
In property theory, the discussion about the commons
started by claiming precisely the contrary, that the commons
were not open access, that they were a social and conceptual
category that included rules and excludability clauses different
from individual property or governmental jurisdictions.
Despite this well known fact, the term commons has become,
once again, a synonym of open access or public domain: “The
global commons are in danger. This is partly due to the role of
intellectual property rights in the commodification of three
separate areas: science, culture and healthcare. All three areas
used to be regarded as important areas of the public domain or
for public access. The first three chapters in this book suggest
that we need to rethink whether such sectors perform best
under the rules of markets and capitalism” (Andersen 2006:
2).
In leftist collectives across the Western world, where the
discussion about the potential of the alternative political com-
mons concentrates, there is the tendency to see the commons
as small-scale institutions that generates equal rights, duties,
and profitability of non-private resources and deeply linked to
environmentalism. This tendency, connects these groups with
an old intellectual genealogy with roots as deep as the early
utopian socialism and communism (More 1516; Fourier 1808;
Owen 1813), or that can be traced back to Proudhon (1876), or
even to the Paris Commune’s intellectual legacy. It is a social
movement that has always been present in many working
class urban areas of the Western world (at least for the last
200 years where critical social thinking has, in one way or
another, articulated the hopes of those dreaming of social
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and especially since the Occupy movement in New York
(2011) and the Indignados in Madrid (2011), the political
commons have re-emerged as a mainstream political move-
ment that has managed to escape from the heavy shadow of
the inaccurately called socialist regimes (Broumas 2017b).
These movements, loosely networked across the world, con-
nect thousands of civil society initiatives that intend to gener-
ate economic and political alternatives to neoliberal capitalism
(Caffentzis and Federici 2014; Laval and Dardot 2015).
Somewhat perplexingly, some political commons propo-
nents advocate a rejection of the idea of property, de facto
advocating for open access resources (Bollier 2014), and at
the same time for an approach to the commons focused on the
practice of collective regulation of the resource by the local
community (Laval and Dardot 2015). Despite their claims
otherwise their emphasis on the existence of a community
(and networks of communities) redirects us to the
excludability/inclusion conundrum, hence property
(Eizenberg 2012; Swyngedouw 2005). Scholars such as de
Angelis have tackled this issue by discussing ‘commoning,’
the practice of creating community: the commons as a rela-
tional practice (2010; 2017).
Although alternative politics are by no means a homoge-
neous social movement, the general aim is social and political
transformation. As a result, in many instances alternative pol-
itics promote conscious efforts to articulate civil society ini-
tiatives with public institutions. There are of course coopera-
tives that operate as authentic commons, as collective private
property, but there are hundreds of initiatives that aspire to
generate social justice through close interactions with govern-
mental agencies (Borch and Kornberger 2015; Chatterton
2010; Esping-Andersen 1990).
The two “public” key concepts, however, public property
and public goods, use the term “public” to mean completely
different things. Public property refers to something owned by
a public institution (e.g., the State owning land expropriated to
declare a national park) and thus has very specific dynamics: it
is managed by specialists, representatives of an abstract insti-
tutional construct. Public goods, on the other hand, are goods
over which it is impossible to impose excludability regulations
and that are inexhaustible and non-rivalrous (e.g., air). Public
goods are part of the public domain in the sense that they are
open access and their use does not diminish their availability
(Dulong de Rosnay and De Martin 2012).
“A public good is something to which everyone has access
but, unlike a common pool resource, one person’ s use of the
resource does not necessarily diminish the potential for use by
another. Public radio stations, scientific knowledge, and world
peace are public goods in that we all enjoy the benefits without
reducing the quantity or quality of the good” (Ostrom et al.
2002: 4–5). Public goods are not common pool resources
because although they are open access, they are an inexhaust-
ible resource. CPRs main characteristic, according to this def-
inition, is not their potential managerial regimes but the fact
then that they comprise a limited resource. However, Ostrom’s
definition cited earlier emphasizes the fact that the size of the
resource makes excludability complicated but not impossible.
In other words, common pool and public goods are not de-
fined as completely opposite types of non-excludable re-
sources: common pool resources, in one of its two possible
post collective action incarnations, open access, allow for as
much excludability as public goods, that is, none.
Conclusion: Theoretical Inconsistencies
The concept of the commons is expanding well beyond its
traditional domain, natural resources management, into the
digital economy and alternative politics. The analysis of the
use of the concepts associated with the theory of the commons
in these new fields points at the fact that this popularity has
come at the expense of conceptual clarity. This review has
provided several examples of such blurriness, as the terms
commons and open access are often used interchangeably.
The interdisciplinary approach that has always character-
ized the work on the commons has had both positive and
negative consequences. A significant amount of this interdis-
ciplinary literature uses the ‘commons’ and ‘open access’ as
synonyms. In some cases, there is also some level of confla-
tion of the commons and public property. This generates a
confusion that undermines the analytic capacity of the classic
conceptual quartet defined by property theory: open access,
and common, private, and public property.
At another level, we observe as well some level of confu-
sion around the use of the category ‘public,’ as public property
is not the same as public goods. The former defines an insti-
tutional arrangement that assumes state ownership while the
later describes non-excludable, non-rivalrous resources (open
access).
The expansion of our analysis of the commons into unfa-
miliar fields, the digital and the alternative political commons,
identified a singular characteristic in collective action theory
that might facilitate these confusions. A key conceptual build-
ing block of collective action theory is the common pool
resource. The very definition of CPRs characterizes them as
a conceptual fiction as they embody untapped resource sys-
tems before management and exploitation. A CPR is a system
that, through unsuccessful or successful collective action, can
become two different things: open access or common
property.
In addition, the fact that some systems of resources that
may have been difficult to defend in the past and were thus
considered CPRs, may become relatively simple to privatize
with changes in technology or politics, adds a further layer of
Hum Ecol
REVISED PROOFambiguity. This implies that the same resource may change itsstatus over time: someone’s CPR might become someone
else’s private good.
In sum, there is much to learn from studying how different
fields define and use the very same concept. We started this
article convinced that we were going to criticize the digital and
political commons literature for its lack of rigor in its confusing
usage of key property theory terms. Instead we have identified
fundamental flaws or complications on basic property theory.
The unresolved theoretical back and forth between resource char-
acteristics analysis and ownership regime research tends to gen-
erate tension and ambiguity. The characteristics of the resource
are, indeed, key to understanding the systems we study, but can-
not be assessed outside time and social context. The resource
must be understood as well inside the framework provided by
the ownership regime that articulates its management.
It is interesting to realize that the concept of CPRs, initially
conceived as the basis of a theory that could question Hardin’s
attribution of open access systems’ characteristics to common
property, has created, by embodying at once the possibility of
open access and common property, a very similar problem.
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